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I.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from a Judgment Establishing Plaintiff's Right to Offset
Contract Purchase Price Against Plaintiffs Costs, Damages and Attorney's Fees dated
December 30, 1997, an Order Establishing Terms and Conditions of Conveyance of
Real Property dated December 30, 1997, and a Judgment and Order Vesting Title of
Real Property in Plaintiff dated February 18, 1998. This Court is vested with
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2 (3) (j).
II.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The determinative statutes and rules in this case are reproduced in
Addendum "B."
III.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of Court Proceedings Prior to First Appeal Affirmed by
the Utah Court of Appeals.
On February 23, 1995, the Plaintiff/Buyer filed a Complaint in the Third
District Court against the Defendant/Seller seeking specific performance and /or
damages arising out of a real estate purchase contract ("Contract") [R. At 001-009].
On January 29, 1996 upon Buyer's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court entered
an Order of Specific Performance requiring the Seller to convey real property
("Property") to Buyer pursuant to the terms of the Contract. In said Judgment, the issue
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of damages and attorney's fees were reserved for another hearing. [R. at 130-32].
On February 28, 1996, the Seller filed a Notice of Appeal. [R. at 138-139].
On April 10, 1997, the Utah Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum Decision affirming
the trial courts judgment. [R. at 284-85]. In their ruling, the Utah Court of Appeals held
that there were "clearly disputes of fact about various aspects of fraud in the
inducement, including whether misrepresentations were made by Buyer's agent."
However, the appellate court held that Seller's reliances were unreasonable and
therefore fraud could not be established.
B. Summary of Court Proceedings Since April 10t 1997 Appellate
Court Decision Affirming Trial Court's Order of Specific Performance.
On July 2, 1997, the Buyer filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to
determine costs, damages and attorney's fees. [R. at 180-181]. A hearing on said
matter was scheduled for July 14, 1997.
On July 10, 1997, the Seller filed for Chapter 7 in the United States
Bankruptcy Court, Central District of California. The Buyer was listed as a secured
creditor on the Seller's bankruptcy filing. On July 11,1997, the Seller filed a Motion to
Deny Attorney's Fees and made no specific reference to the damages and costs. [R. at
213-14]. That on or about October 31, 1997, the Seller was released from all
dischargeable debts by the United States Bankruptcy Court, Central District of
California. [R. at 289].
Due to the automatic stay provisions found in 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(C),
the Buyer was prohibited from responding to the Seller's Motion to Deny Attorney's
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Fees. However, after the Seller's discharge on October 31, 1997, the automatic stay
was lifted thereby enabling the Buyer to file the Affidavit of Mary Ann Hansen in
Response to Defendant's (Seller) Motion to Deny Attorney's Fees. [R. at 330-33].
On November 17, 1997, the Buyer once again filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment as to Costs, Damages and Attorney's Fees. [R. At 321-22]. Said hearing
was scheduled for November 24, 1997. On November 24, 1997, the Seller filed an
Objection to Motion for Summary Judgment [R. at 359-72] and a Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Objection. [R. at 398-407]. The Seller
alleged inter alia that Seller refused to purchase the Property and therefore rescinded
his right to purchase, that Buyer claims were discharged in bankruptcy, that Buyer's
claims were precluded by 11 U.S.C. 553 Setoff, and that Buyer's attorney's fees were
not reasonable. The Summary Judgment hearing was rescheduled for December 8,
1998. Buyer filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of this Motion on December 1,
1998. [R. at 430-38].
On November 18, 1998, the Seller's Bankruptcy Trustee, Karl Anderson,
abandoned the real property in dispute by filing a no asset report. [R. at 420]. The
abandonment of Property under 11 U.S.C. § 554 reverted title back to Seller subject to
Buyer's judgment of specific performance. The Buyer was required to wait until the no
asset report was filed before he could proceed against the Property. [R. at 414-17, and
421]. Therefore, on December 1, 1997, the Buyer filed Plaintiff's Motion for Order
Establishing Terms and Conditions of Conveyance of Real Property. [R. at 418-19].
The hearing on this matter was scheduled to be heard on December 8, 1997 at the
3

same time as the Motion for Summary Judgment as to Costs, Damages and Attorney's
Fees. [R. at 425].
The Motion for Damages, Costs and Attorney's Fees and the Motion
Establishing Terms and Conditions were taken under advisement on December 8,
1997. On December 30, 1998, the Court entered the following two judgments:
Judgment Establishing Plaintiffs Right to Offset
Contract Purchase Price Against Plaintiff's Costs
Damages and Attorney's Fees
Said Judgment held that pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 553 and the equitable
doctrine of "recoupment" the Buyer was entitled to offset the contract sales price of
$37,500.00 against damages, costs, and attorney's fees in the amount of $35,563.24.
Consequently, it was held that at the time of closing the Buyer would be obligated to
the Seller in the amount of $1,936.76; [R. at 467-70] and,
Order Establishing Terms and Conditions of
Conveyance of Real Property.
Said Judgment required the Seller to convey Property to Buyer with the
Buyer being given an offset of $35,563.24 against the purchase price of $37,500.00.
That each party was ordered to execute all necessary documents to effectuate
the closing in accordance with the terms of the Contract. The Court further held that
as provided under Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, if the Seller refused to
comply with the Order, then Associated Title Company located in Park City, Utah would
be ordered to sign and execute the necessary documents to effectuate the closing. [R.
at 471-73].
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The Seller wrongfully filed a Notice of Pendency of Action in the Summit
County Recorder's Office. Said Notice made reference to a Superior Court of
California, County of San Bernardino pending action against the Seller's agent. [R. at
506-507].
That Seller refused to convey Property as required by the Judgment
Establishing Terms and specifically represented to Associated Title Company that she
would not close. [R. at 481-82]. That upon Seller's refusal to close the transaction and
the filing of the Notice of Pendency of Action, Associated Title Company declined to
convey Property or issue title insurance as required under the Judgment and the
Contract. [R. at 481].
That Buyer was required to file a Petition to Nullify Lien in a separate
action in the Third District Court, in Summit County, State of Utah/Civil No. 980600027.
The hearing on said Petition was scheduled for February 18, 1998.
That since Seller refused to convey Property and Associated Title
Company declined due to the Notice of Pendency of Action filed by the Seller, the
Buyer filed for Summary Judgment for an Order Vesting Title of Real Property in
Plaintiff/Buyer. [R. at 488-89]. This matter was scheduled for February 18, 1998 at the
same time as the Petition to Nullify Lien.
That Buyer deposited with the Third District Court a cashiers check in the
amount of $1,926.76 which was the amount required to close the Property as per the
December 30, 1998 Judgment. [R. at 479].
That Seller's attorney was present at the hearing and filed no pleadings or
5

affidavits in response to the Petition to Nullify Lien or the Motion Vesting Title in
Plaintiff. On February 18, 1998, the Court entered the following judgment:
Judgment and Order Vesting Title of
Real Property in Plaintiff
Said judgment was authorized by Rule 70 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Court vested title of Property in Buyer thereby extinguishing all of Seller's right, title and
interest in the Property. [R. at 520-22]. At the hearing the Court required the Buyer's
attorney to prepare a supplemental order as to attorney's fees before any additional
fees would be ordered. [R. at 533].
It should be noted that the trial court at the February 18, 1998 hearing
also entered an Order Nullifying Lien. [R. at 520].
On February 26, 1998, the Buyer mailed an Affidavit of Attorney's Fees
and Costs along with an Attorney's Fees Order to the Seller. That Seller failed to file
any responsive pleadings or objections to said Order so it was entered by the Court on
March 10, 1998. Said Attorney's Fees Order awarded an additional judgment for
attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $1,254.00. Said judgment was to be taken
out of funds deposited with the Third District Court Clerk. [R. at 532-33]. The Affidavit
of Attorney's Fees demonstrated that the Buyer had incurred fees, costs, and attorney's
fees in the amount of $3,234.50 since December 30, 1997, but that Buyer's counsel
was willing to accept $1,254.00 from deposited funds as payment in full. [R. at 524-25
and 528].
From the deposited funds, the Summit County Court Clerk issued a check
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in the amount of $1,254.00 to Buyer's attorney, $653.96 to the Summit County
Treasurer for 1997 property taxes, and the balance of $28.80 to the Seller. [R. at 531
and 534].
On March 20, 1998, the Seller filed a Notice of Appeal as to the Order
Vesting Title and Real Property in Plaintiff/Buyer. [R. at 545].

C.

Appellant's Mischaracterization of "Facts".

The Seller characterizes several matters as "fact." Those matters are as
follows:
The Seller goes into great detail attempting to relitigate the January 29,
1996 Specific Performance Judgment that was affirmed by this Court. In particular, the
Seller's elaborates in great detail as to the facts surrounding the signing of the
Contract. [Appellant's Brief at 5-7]. Several of these alleged facts were submitted to
the trial court for the first time on November 24, 1997 by way of facsimile and are not
supported by affidavit. In contrast, the Buyer has filed with the trial court four different
affidavits which tend to support the proposition that the Seller got "cold feet" and was
taking any action necessary to get out of the contract. [R. at 91-111 and 117-119].
The Seller alleges that a Lis Pendens in this matter was filed prior to the
lawsuit. This fact is incorrect. The Complaint was filed on February 23, 1995 and the
Lis Pendens was filed on February 24, 1995.
The Seller tends to imply that the Buyer incorrectly changed the locks on
the property after the Order Vesting Title in Plaintiff/Buyer was entered. Said Order
7

vested ownership of the Property in Buyer and pursuant to the terms of the Contract "all
furniture and fixtures, keys and appliances currently at the property" were to be
conveyed to Buyer. [R. at 91-5], Therefore, Buyers changing and the locks and
preventing Seller access to the Property was totally appropriate as per court order.
D.

Additional Facts to be Considered.
1.

That the Contract at fl 16 provides that in the event of

default the Buyer may elect to sue for specific performance and/or damages. [R. at 96].
2.

That the Contract at <|j 17 provides that in the event of

dispute the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
[R. at 96].
3.

That Seller refused to close the transaction when it was

represented to Seller's attorney that Buyer was going to obtain a prejudgment writ of
attachment on the sales proceeds. [R. at 415].
4.

That on May 12, 1997 Seller's Utah attorney, Dwayne

Vance, verifies by correspondence to Seller, that Buyer has offered to waive claims for
rental income and further legal proceedings if Seller would pay attorney's fees in the
amount of $17,085.00. [R. at 243].
5.

In May 14, 1997 correspondence to Dwayne Vance from

Seller's California attorney, Wacy Armstrong, it states that Mr. Armstrong has been
retained for the "sole purpose of attempting to negotiate a reduction in costs and
attorney's fees incurred by the plaintiff/buyer in the above-referenced matter." [R. at
238]. Mr. Armstrong verifies that Buyer had agreed to accept $10,000.00 as payment
8

in full for costs, damages, and attorney's fees. [R. at 238].
6.

That a "Mutual Release Agreement was prepared wherein

the Buyer agreed to accept $5,000.00 as payment in full for costs, damages, and
attorney's fees. [R. at 380-81].
7.

In November 14, 1997 correspondence to Judge Pat B.

Brian from Wacy Armstrong, it states that Mr; Armstrong had been retained by Seller to
"negotiate resolution of this matter." [R. at 325].
8.

In November 24, 1997 correspondence to Judge Pat B.

Brian from Seller it states that Buyer has spent $2,000.00 in attorney's fees attempting
to negotiate with Mary Ann Hansen (Buyer's attorney). [R. at 410].
IV.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONVEYED TITLE OF
REAL PROPERTY TO BUYER SINCE THE SELLER
REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH COURT ORDER
REQUIRING HER TO CONVEY PROPERTY
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary
judgment should be rendered forthwith if the pleadings show there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
"A genuine issue of fact exists where, on the basis of the facts in the record,
reasonable minds could differ." Jackson v. Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). It
is appropriate for summary judgment to be granted when reasonable minds could not
differ on the facts to be determined from the evidence presented. Olympus Hills

9

Shopping Center Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Center Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 450 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994), cert denied. 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995); Heslp v. Bank of Utah. 839 P.2d
828, 838 (Utah 1992). "To sustain a summary judgment, the pleadings, evidence,
admissions and inferences therefrom, viewed most favorable to the loser, must show
that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the winner is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Such showing must preclude, as a matter of law, all
reasonable possibility that the loser could win if given a trial." Frederick May & Co. v.
Dunn, 368 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1962).
Rule 70 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
If real or personal property is within the state, the court in lieu
of directing a conveyance thereof may enter a judgment
divesting the title of any party and vesting it in other and such
judgment has the effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law.
On December 30, 1997, the Court had previously entered an Order
Establishing Terms and Conditions of Conveyance of Real Property with said Judgment
requiring the Seller to convey title to the Buyer. The Seller refused to convey title and
instead filed a Notice of Pendency of Action. Therefore, since neither the Seller nor
Associated Title Company would sign the necessary closing documents to effectuate
closing, the Court on February 18, 1998, correctly conveyed Property pursuant to Rule
70 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
In this matter, the Seller did not come forward with any admissible
evidence to create genuine issues of fact upon which reasonable minds could differ.
Instead, she comes forward alleging facts which are contrary to substantial evidence in
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the record along with a claim that a procedural error prevented the Court from ruling on
the judgments in this matter.

A.

The Record Clearly Demonstrates That the Buyer Did
Not Refuse to Close on the Property.

The Seller alleges that the Buyer refused to close the transaction with
Associated Title Company and that the Buyer was demanding that the proceeds from
the sale be placed in escrow to pay attorney fees and damages. These allegations
were never put into an affidavit and appear in the Objection and Memorandums filed by
the Seller. [R. at 369]. This assertion is in direct conflict with the Affidavit of Buyer's
counsel, which states that Seller refused to close after she learned Buyer was going to
get a prejudgment writ of attachment on the sales proceeds. [R. at 415]. Furthermore,
as reiterated above, extensive negotiations, for which the Seller paid her attorneys
$2,000.00, occurred between the parties from approximately May 12, 1997 until the
Seller's bankruptcy filing of July 10, 1997. The record also demonstrates that Buyer's
counsel prepared a "Mutual Release" as part of this negotiation process and attempted
to resolve all pending issues. [R. 380-81]. However, the Seller decided to file for
Chapter 7 Bankruptcy rather than settle the matter.
B

Seller's Conduct Prevents Her From Later Claiming That
Buyer Rescinded the Contract,

When the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the Seller, even
though they are unsupported by Affidavit and directly conflict with the Affidavits
submitted by Buyer, the Court must hold that Seller waived any rights to rescind the
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contract.
First, the Seller alleges that Buyer refused to close the transaction at
Associated Title Company on April 28, 1997, and that Buyer was insisting that the
proceeds come out of escrow on May 12, 1997. [R. at 369]. The Seller argues that this
amounts to recession and therefore the Seller is not obligated to convey the Property to
Buyer. However, the records clearly demonstrates that after said alleged recision by
the Buyer, the Seller never expressed an intent to rescind the contract and instead paid
her attorney's $2,000.00 to negotiate with Buyer.
In Soter's v. Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan. 857 P.2d 935, 939-40 (Utah
1993), the Utah Supreme Court held as follows:
This court has consistently defined waiver as the intentional
relinquishment of a known right. Waiver requires three elements:
(1) an existing right, benefit or advantage; (2) knowledge of its
existence; and (3) an intention to relinquish the right. Citing Rees
v. Intermountain HealthCare. Inc.. 808 P.2d 1069, 1073-75.
Also, "Conduct that may imply an intent to waive includes failure to take prompt action
to rescind after a party has knowledge of the facts creating a right to rescind a
contract." Powell v. Goff. 868 P.2d 26, 28 (Or. App. 1994).
Clearly, Seller's actions of participating in negotiations with Buyer's
attorney amount to an intentional waiver. The Seller was represented by two attorneys
and if the Buyer or Buyer's counsel had rescinded the Contract, Seller's attorneys
should have immediately declined further negotiations. Therefore, the Seller is now
estopped from claiming that the Buyer allegedly refused to close the transaction.
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C.

Even though a "Notice of Submit" Was Not Filed in this
Matter, the Court Correctly Entered Summary Judgment
Against the Seller.

The Seller argues in her brief that the Motions for Summary Judgment
were not ripe for consideration since a Notice to Submit was not filed prior to the
Judgments entered in this matter. [Appellant's Brief at 15]. The record reflects that as
required by Rule 4-501 (f), the Buyer served a Notice of Hearing at least ten days
before both the December 8, 1997 hearing and the February 18, 1998 hearing. [ R. at
412 and 477].
The Utah Supreme Court in Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d
789 (Utah 1991) held that in a motion for summary judgment notice violation did not
divest the court with jurisdiction and that "such a violation will void the grant unless the
violation amounts to a harmless error." Id. At 796.
Crookston at 796 also holds:
"Harmless error" is defined . . as an error that is "sufficiently
inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood
that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." Put in
other words, an error is harmful only if the likelihood of a different
outcome is sufficiently high as to undermine our confidence in the
verdict. Quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989).
Applying the Crookston summary judgment analysis to this matter, it is
very clear that the failure to file a "Notice to Submit" while giving the Seller adequate
notice of the hearing as required under U.C.A. 4-501 (f) amounted to a harmless error
since there is no likelihood the trial court would have arrived at a different outcome if
the Notice to Submit had been filed. In addition, the record is devoid of any objection
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either written or oral as to Seller's objection that the matter was not ripe for decision.
"[MJatters not presented to the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal."
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Develop. Co. 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983).
Buyers failure to file the Notice to Submit were not objected to at the trial court and
therefore this issue cannot be raised on appeal.
V.

AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER SECTION 553 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
AND UNDER THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF RECOUPMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES,
COSTS AND DAMAGES TO THE BUYER
As previously outlined in Summary of Court Proceedings above, the
Buyer obtained a Judgment of Specific Performance. "A Contract for the sale of land
ceases to be executory or rejectable in bankruptcy, at the instant a decree of specific
performance is issued." In Re Sundial Asphalt Co., Inc. 147 B.R. 72, 80 (E.D.N.Y
1992). The general rule is that if a claim is properly discharged in bankruptcy, the
creditors may not thereafter seek to enforce it against the debtor or the debtor's postbankruptcy property. However, the bankruptcy code under 11 U.S.C. §553 allows a
creditor to offset a mutual debt owing to the debtor if both debts arose before the
commencement of the bankruptcy. In addition, there is an equitable doctrine of
"recoupment" which allows creditors to offset obligations arising out of the same
transaction.
A. Under 11 U.S.C. S553, Buyer is Entitled to Offset His Award of
Costs, Damages, and Attorney's Fees Against the Contract
Purchase Price.
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11 U.S.C. § 553(a) generally recognizes and preserves the rights of setoff where
four conditions exist:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

The creditor holds a "claim" against the debtor that arose before
the commencement of the case;
The creditor owes a "debt" to the debtor that also arose before the
commencement of the case;
The claim and debt are "mutual"; and
The claim and debt are each valid and enforceable.

5 Collier on Bankruptcy. § 553.01 at 553-7, (15th ed. 1998) ("Collier").
Definition of "Claim". Collier § 553.01 [1](a) at 553-13 defines the
term "claim" as follows:
Any right to payment, regardless of whether the right is reduced to
judgment, and regardless of whether the right is legal, equitable,
liquidated, unliquidated, matured, unmatured, contingent, fixed,
disputed, undisputed, secured or unsecured.
In the instant case, an Order of Specific Performance was issued
requiring the Seller to convey title to real property to the Buyer. Therefore, according
to the above definition, the Seller/Creditor holds a "claim" against the Buyer/Creditor
prior to the commencement of the Bankruptcy case. As previously outlined above, the
Buyer/Creditor was listed as a secured creditor on Schedule D of Seller's bankruptcy
filing.
Definition of "Debt". The second requirement of setoff requires
that there also be a pre-petition debt owed by the debtor to creditor upon which setoff
may be taken. "Code § 553 does not prohibit the setoff of a creditor's claim arising prepetition, unliquidated or unmatured as of the petition date, against a debtor's prepetition claim." Braniff Airways. Inc. v. Exxon Co.. U.S.A.. 814 F2d 1030, 1036 (5th Cir.
15

1987) (Citing In re Morristown Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 42 B.R. 413-417 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1984).
In Re Delta Energy Resources. Inc., 67 B.R. 8, 12 (Bkrtcy. W.D. La.
1986), it was determined that a debt was "pre-petition" since U[A]II the transactions
which gave rise to this debt occurred prior to the petition date." Furthermore, In re
Delta, cites an unpublished opinion in which it was determined that claims were "prepetition," because the debts were based entirely on pre-petition factors. In re Marian
Corporation, Case No. 83-00373, Adv. No. 85-0100, November 1, 1985 (Bankr. S.D.
Ala).
Furthermore, In Re Stewart Foods, Inc., 64 F.3d 141 (4th Cir. 1995) held
as follows:
The rejection of an executory contract constitutes a breach of
contract, and a party's damages resulting from that rejection are
treated as a prepetition claim..." [Emphasis added]. Id. At 144.
Regardless of the nature of the contract, if at the time of the
bankruptcy filing the debtor has an obligation under the contract to
pay money to the non-debtor party, that obligation is handled as a
pre-petition claim in the bankruptcy proceedings. ]d. At 145.
Following the analogy contained In re Delta and In re Stewart, it is very
clear that all of Plaintiffs legal fees, damages, and costs are pre-petition regardless of
when they were incurred since the "transaction which gave rise to this debt" was the
Seller's breach of the Contract. Consequently, all resulting damages are considered
pre-petition regardless of when they were incurred since the Seller breached an
obligation under the Contract, prior to the bankruptcy filing , and the terms of the
Contract obligate her to pay costs, damages, and attorney's fees. Therefore, all of

16

Buyer's costs, damages and attorney's fees are pre-petition.
In addition, 11 U.S.C. §553(a)(3)(a) specifically provides that a debt
cannot be offset if it was incurred by the debtor 90 days before the filing of the
bankruptcy petition. However, pursuant to the above case law analysis, all of Buyer's
costs, damages, and attorney's fees are considered to have been incurred at the time
of Seller's breach. Therefore, all of Seller's costs, damages and attorney's fees are
pre-petition under 11 U.S.C. §553.
Definition of "Mutual".

Collier § 553.03[3][b] at 553-28 states

that "[t]he threshold requirement of mutuality is that the relevant claim and debt must
exist between the same parties." "This mutuality requirement mandates that the debts
involved be between the same parties standing In the same capacity.
The requirement of mutuality is obviously present In the instant case
since the Buyer owes the contract purchase price to Seller as per Contract, and the
Seller is obligated to Buyer under a Specific Performance Judgment which provides for
costs, damages, and attorney's fees.
Definition of "Valid Obligation". Collier S 553.0314! at 553-1
states that "the relevant claim and debt must each constitute a valid obligation." In the
present matter, a valid obligation exists since it has been reduced to judgment and
affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals.
The Seller misstates the law under 11 U.S.C. §553 as it applies to the
facts In this matter. In particular, the Seller claims that the Buyer's debt is not allowable
and argues that the Buyer's supporting case of In re Davidovich. 901 F.2d 1533 (10th
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Cir. 1990) does not support Buyer's position. The Court In re Davidovich overturned
the bankruptcy's court ruling as to "recoupment issues" since the claims were not part
of the same transaction. [See discussion of recoupment below] and they also
overturned the ruling prohibiting offset since the claim arose after the bankruptcy filing.
Clearly In this matter as argued above, the Buyer's claim arose before the filing of the
bankruptcy and so the ruling In re Davidovich would not preclude Buyer from
recovering under 11 U.S.C. § 553.
Furthermore, the Seller cites In re Johnson, 13 B.R. 185 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn 1981) as a case which would prohibit the Buyer In this matter from any off set
against the Seller outside the bankruptcy proceedings. In re Johnson is a case which
involves the right to set off a debt discharged In bankruptcy against a claim brought
under 15 U.S.C. § 1601 Truth In Lending Act (TILA). In the In re Johnson case, the
debtors commenced an action against the creditor under TILA claiming violation of
usury laws after the debtors discharge. The court held that a creditor could not off set
a pre-petition claim against a post-petition liability under a TILA claim. The creditors
liability to the debtor was not valid and owing until after the debtor's discharge.
Therefore, the In re Johnson ruling is clearly not applicable to this case since this
matter does not involve a TILA claim and the Creditor/Buyer's obligation to the
Debtor/Seller arose prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy.
The Buyer has established that all the necessary elements of 11 U.S.C. §
553 and since the claim is pre-petition, the trial court property allowed Buyer to set off
his costs, damages, and attorney's fees.
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B.

Under Equitable Doctrine of "Recoupment" Buyer is
Entitled to Offset his Costs, Damages and Attorney's
Fees Against the Contract Purchase Price.

Not only is Buyer entitled to offset his costs, damages and attorney's fees
under 11 U.S.C. § 553, he is also permitted to offset those items under the equitable
doctrine of "recoupment."
The Bankruptcy Code does not mention or define the term "recoupment,"
yet recoupment is an equitable doctrine that has long applied In the
bankruptcy context. Defining the term with any precision is complicated
by its similarity to the doctrine of setoff, as well as the tenancy of some
courts to use the terms "setoff and "recoupment" interchangeable...
Nevertheless, the relevant distinctions are important because, as a
general rule, the requirements and limitation of Section 553 do not apply
to recoupments. Collier §553.10 at 553-100.
"In recoupment, the elements of the debt may arise either before or after
the commencement of the case." Matter of Gaither, 200 B.R. 847 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ohio
1996) citing In re Harmon, 188 B.R. 421, 435 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1995). "Creditor may
exercise right to recoupment against the debtor both as to prepetition and post-petition
debts." Matter of Gaither, 200 B.R. at 848.
"The only real requirement regarding recoupment is that the sum can be
reduced only by matters arising out of the same transaction as the original sum." ]d, at
850 citing Waldschmidt v. CBS, Inc., 14 B.R. 309, 314 (M.D. Tenn. 1981). "A single
contract may be considered as one transaction for the purposes of recoupment." Matter
of Gaither, 200 B.R. at 850, citing InreAlpco, Inc., 62 B.R. 184, 188 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1986). "Recoupment is justified In single contract cases since there is but one recovery
due on contract and that recovery must be determined by taking into account mutual
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benefits and obligations of the contract." In Re Hefferman Memorial Hospital Dist, 192
B.R. 228, 231 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Cal. 1996). "In bankruptcy, the recoupment doctrine has
been applied primarily where the creditor's claim against the debtor and the debtor's
claim against the creditor arise out of the same contract." Lee v. Schweiker, 739 F.2d
870,875(1984).
In this matter, the Seller once again incorrectly argues that the facts In
this case preclude recovery under the equitable doctrine of recoupment.

In particular,

the Seller argues that the Buyer is prohibited from collecting from the Seller since said
obligation was discharged In bankruptcy. However, this analysis completely ignores
the case law supporting recoupment which does allow offset regardless of whether the
debt is pre-petition or post-petition so long as the cause of action arises out of the
same transaction.
The Seller incorrectly claims that In re Johnson, 13 B.R. at 185, which is
the footnote case In re Davidovic, supra, precludes the Buyer from recovering. As
previously argued above, In re Johnson involves a matter under the Truth In Lending
Act and involves a post-petition judgment which was not filed until after the debtor's
discharge. Those facts clearly are not applicable to this action.
The Seller also debates that the Buyer should not be allowed to raise the
recoupment argument since it was not raised until December 1, 1997 In Buyer's Reply
Brief In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. at 430-30]. The Court did not
rule on this decision until December 30, 1997 and the record is void of any objection to
this argument. Rule 103(a)(1), Utah Rules of Evidence requires a clear and definite
20

objection to evidence before appellate review can be requested. Therefore, the Seller
is precluded from objecting to Buyer's recoupment arguments In his Reply
Memorandum. Said Memorandum was mailed November 26, 1998 and was not ruled
on until December 30, 1997. There was adequate time for Seller to object prior to the
December 30, 1997 entry of judgment. "Issue not raised in trial court would not be
considered for first time on appeal." Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982).
The Buyer was correctly awarded his costs, damages and attorney's fees under the
doctrine of recoupment since the cause of action arises out of the transaction.
VII.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER AS TO
DAMAGES, COSTS, AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
As established above, the trial court correctly determined that Buyer was
entitled to offset his costs, damages and attorney's fees against the Contract purchase
price. Sine the terms of the Contract provide for costs and reasonable attorney's fees
In action brought to enforce the Contract, the trial court correctly awarded summary
judgment to the Buyer.
A.

Buyer is entitled to Attorney's Fees.

"Provisions In written contracts providing for payment of attorney fees
should ordinarily be honored, including fees incurred on appeal and attorney fees
incurred In seeking specific performance." Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 796, 798
(Utah App. 1992). Also, the Utah Supreme Court held in Management Services v.
Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980), that "[a] provision for
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payment of attorney's fees In a contract includes attorney's fees by the prevailing party
on appeal as well as at trial, if the action if brought to enforce the contract..."
The Seller argues that the trial court improperly awarded the Buyer
$2,000.00 for attorney fee's which were paid to a California bankruptcy attorney.
These fees were absolutely necessary so that Buyer could preserve his rights under
the Specific Performance Judgment In Utah. Said attorney was able to convince the
bankruptcy trustee that the Property had little or inconsequential value to the
bankruptcy estate and therefore pursuant to 11 U.S.C. fl 554 the bankruptcy trustee
abandoned the Property. The fees were incurred by the Buyer and were necessary to
enforcing his Specific Performance Judgment. Buyer is entitled to reimbursement of
these fees.
B.

Plaintiff is entitled to Damages and Costs,

The Contract at 1} 16 specifically provides:

sum

If Seller defaults, in addition to the return of the Earnest Money Deposit,
Buyer may elect to either accept from Seller as liquidated damages, a
equal to the Earnest Money Deposit, or sue Seller for specific
performance and/or damages.
"In awarding damages for breach of contract, courts attempt to place the

nonbreaching party In as good a position as if the contract had been performed."
Sauders, supra at 808.
In the Buyer's Memorandum, every effort was made to put the parties In
the same position as if the transaction had closed as required by the Contract. The
Buyer was credited with rental income that he would have received had the property
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been transferred to him as per Contract. In addition, deductions for property taxes and
association dues were taken from the lost rental income. [R. at 338]. Also, interest the
Seller would have received on the money had she received it was deducted from
Buyer's lost rental income [R. 276]. Every effort was taken to assure that the parties
were placed In the same positions they would have been had the transaction closed as
contracted. In addition, it should be noted that the record establishes that Buyer was
only given rental income up through November 1997 even though the Property was not
transferred to Buyer until February, 1998. [R. at 276 and 338].
The Seller claims that Buyer is receiving double recovery for the 1997
property taxes since he received the rental income for 1997. This analysis is incorrect
since the documentation clearly provides that Buyer was credited with rental income he
should have received up through November 1997 (even though Property didn't transfer
until February 18, 1998), but that a deduction was taken for the 1997 property taxes.
There was no double payment. The terms of the Contract provided that Seller was
obligated for her pro-rata share of property taxes.
The Seller further claims that the loan origination fee and title company
fees are double payments. These are costs that were actually incurred by the Buyer
and that he lost due to Seller's breach of the contract. In addition, the Seller will be
required to incur these fees again once this matter is settled and he can obtain title
insurance on the Property.
In addition, the Seller argues that the postage and miscellaneous long
distance phone calls and the trip to Salt Lake are not recoverable. They are expenses
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which were incurred by the Buyer and costs that he lost due to Seller's breach. Buyer
should be put in the same position he would had been if the Property had closed.
Also, the Seller never objected to the issues of costs or damages in the trial court and
should then be precluded from raising them on appeal.
And finally, since the entry of the December 30, 1997 judgment until
February 28, 1998, the Buyer incurred total costs and attorney's fees In the amount of
$3,234.50. [R. At 525 and 528]. However, Buyer's attorney agreed to accept $1,254.00
since that was all that was left In escrow with the Summit County Court Clerk.
Therefore, Sellers arguments that many of the costs should be disallowed is not
relevant since $1,980.50 [$3,234.50 less $1,254.00] of costs and attorney's fees can be
deducted before Buyer would owe Seller a reimbursement.
The Seller argues that since the Buyer's Affidavit is not notarized it is
inadmissible hearsay. In Hobelman Motors, Inc., v. Allred, 685 P.2d 544, 546 (Utah
1984), citing Strange v. Ostlund, Utah, 594 P.2d 877,880 (1979), the Supreme Court of
Utah held:
"[l]f the opposing party does not move In a timely fashion to object to
affidavits or strike them and hence they are admitted, then that party
waives the right to show that they do not comply with Rule 56(e) of the
Utah Rules of Civile Procedure."
Summary Judgment movant who took no action to contest an unnotarized
affidavit submitted by nonmoving party, waived any right to contest, on
appeal, admission of affidavit.
Id. at 545.
In this matter the record is void of any objection to the affidavit of Buyer
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and therefore, following the Hobelman Motors analysis, the Seller has waived all rights
to object to the admissibility of said affidavit.
VII.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly conveyed title of real property to the Buyer under
Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. There was a valid Judgment requiring
the Seller to convey title of the Property to Buyer and the evidence clearly establishes
that Seller refused to convey title as ordered. Even when viewing the facts in the light
most favorable to the Seller, the Seller's conduct clearly demonstrates an intentional
waiver and therefore, the Seller is estopped from claiming Buyer rescinded the
Contract.
Furthermore, the trial court correctly awarded the Buyer costs, damages
and attorney's fees under 11 U.S.C. §553 of the bankruptcy code and under the
equitable doctrine of recoupment. All of the elements of both of these theories have
been established. Even if one of the theories is disallowed, the Buyer will be entitled to
full recovery under the other theory. Therefore, Buyer was entitled to offset his costs,
damages and attorney's fees against the Contract purchase price.
The terms of the Contract are very clear in providing Buyer with costs,
damages and attorney's fees. Every effort was made to place the parties in the same
position as if the Contract had been performed. The Court correctly awarded Buyer his
costs, damages and attorney's fees. The summary judgment must be affirmed.
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RESPECTFULLY submitted this 30th day of September, 1998

arywvn Hansen
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
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Shawn D. Turner
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ADDENDUM A
COPIES OF ORDERS APPEALED FROM
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FILED
DZC3IM397

MARY ANN HANSEN (5200)
Attorney for Plaintiff
854 NORTH 910 EAST
P.O. BOX 1994
OREM, UTAH 84059
Telephone: (801) 226-0300
Facsimile: (801) 764-0300
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Third District Court
fiy-

jvr.0 •
Deputy Clerk, Summit County
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STEVE SCOTT,
JUDGMENT ESTABLISHING
PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO OFFSET
CONTRACT PURCHASE PRICE
AGAINST PLAINTIFF'S COSTS,
DAMAGES, AND ATTORNEY'S FEES

Plaintiff,
vs.
LINDA MAJORS,

:

Defendant.

:

Civil No. 950300019CN

:

Judge Pat B. Brian

PLAINTIFF'S Motion for Summary Judgment to determine attorney's fees,
costs and damages and whether those items can be setoff by the real estate purchase
contract came on regularly for hearing on the 8th day of December, 1997. The Plaintiff
appeared by and through his counsel, Mary Ann Hansen. The Defendant did not appear.
The Court requested additional time to review the bankruptcy issues.
The Court, having received and reviewed the Amended Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment,

800KZZHG|A^

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Objection, Objection to
Motion for Summary Judgment, and Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment, and the Court having reviewed the pleadings and other matters on
file herein, being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

That the Court finds there are no genuine issues of material fact in

dispute and as a matter of law, Plaintiff is entitled to Summary Judgment.
2.

That issued herewith is a Judgment Establishing Terms and Conditions

of Conveyance of Real Property.
3.

That the record demonstrates that pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 553 and the

equitable doctrine of "recoupment," the Plaintiff is entitled offset the contract sales price of
Thirty Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($37,500.00) against his costs, damages and
attorney's fees.
4.

That the record demonstrates that Plaintiffs costs, damages and

attorney's fees are as follows:
a.
b.
c.
d.

5.

Attorney's Fees
Costs
Lost Rental Income
Offset by Lost Income
Damages

$25,386.00
$ 394.00

TOTAL

$35,563.24

$ 8,756.50
$1,026.50

That the record further demonstrates that Plaintiff is entitled to a
2
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judgment against the Defendant in the amount of Thirty Five Thousand Five Hundred Sixty
Three Dollars and Twenty Four Cents ($35,563.24).
6.

That the record further demonstrates that Plaintiff should be entitled

to offset $35,563.24 against the purchase price of $37,500.00 .
7.

That the record further demonstrates that Plaintiff should be obligated

to Defendant in the amount of One Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty Six Dollars and Seventy
Six Cents ($1,936.76) at closing on property.
THEREFORE, this Court enters judgment on behalf of the Plaintiff and
against the Defendant as to his claim to offset his costs, damages, and attorney's fees
against the contract purchase price. The Court orders the Defendant to comply with all
terms as outlined in the real estate purchase contract entered into between the parties.
DATED this J 0 day of December, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

itttMmw/////,,,

:

;
PAT B. BRIAN
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
,

Fe es

he reby

certify that a true and correct copy of Judgment Estabiishing

was maiied this 3&_ day of December, 1997, postage prepaid, addressed :
Linda Majors
P.O. Box 1418
Twin Peaks, Ca 92391
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MARY ANN HANSEN (5200)
Attorney for Plaintiff
854 NORTH 910 EAST
P.O. BOX 1994
OREM, UTAH 84059
Telephone: (801) 226-0300
Facsimile: (801) 764-0300
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT.COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

S*
STEVE SCOTT,

JUDGMENT ESTABLISHING
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF
CONVEYANCE OF REAL PROPERTY

PLAINTIFF,
-vs-

Civil No. 950300019CN

LINDA MAJORS,

Judge Pat B. Brian

DEFENDANT.

BASED UPON this Court's Order, entered on or about January 29, 1996.
granting Plaintiff Summary Judgment of Specific Performance. Plaintiff is hereby awarded
judgment against Defendant as follows:
1

Defendant shall convey to Plaintiff fee simple title to the following real

property located in Summit County, State of Utah:

900KZZHMBE 4 2 7 ^

D E t - 3 0 - 9 7

T"UE

1 0 = 5 1
•=• -

©

S

Unit 407, Carriage House Condominiums, a Utah Condominium
Project, together with an undivided 2/325ths ownership interest
in and to the common areas and facilities of the project as th^
same are identified and established in the record of survey map
recorded August 10, 1988 as Entry No. 295097 and the
condominium declarations recorded August 10, 1988 as Entry No.
295098 in Book 489 at Page 15 of the official records in the office
of the Summit County Recorder.
2.

That pursuant to the Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") the

Plaintiff is obligated to purchase the subject real property from the Defendant in the
amount of Thirty Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($37,500.00).

However, the

Plaintiff is allowed an offset against the purchase price the amount of Thirty Five Thousand
Five Hundred Sixty Three Dollars and Twenty Four Cents ($35,563.24), which is the total
sum of Plaintiffs attorney's fees, costs and damages in this matter. Therefore, Plaintiff
shall deliver to the Escrow Agent, in escrow, the total consideration for the subject property
in the amount of One Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty Six Dollars and Seventy Six Cent
($1,936.76).
3.

The closing of the conveyance (the "Closing") shall be held at the

offices of Associated Title Company, located at 1755 Prospector Avenue, Park City, Utah
(the "Escrow Agent"),
at such other place and time as shall be mutually agreed to, in writing, by the Plaintiff
and the Defendant. At Closing, the following shall occur, each of which shall be considered
a condition precedent to the other and all of which shall be considered as taking place
simultaneously:
2

a.

The Defendant shall execute and deliver to the Escrow Agent,

in escrow, a general warranty deed for the subject property.
b.

The Plaintiff shall deliver to the Escrow Agent, in escrow, the

consideration for the subject property as outlined above.
c.

The Plaintiff and Defendant shall execute and deliver to each

other such other documents (including without limitation closing statements) and take such
other actions as necessary and appropriate to effectuate the Closing in accordance
herewith and with the Real Estate Purchase Contract.
d.

That if Defendant fails to comply with any of the above-

referenced items necessary for Closing, then Associated Title Company shall be required
to execute all necessary documents including but not limited to closing statement and
general warranty deed. In the event that Associated Title is required to sign and or execute
any Closing documents, Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that said
documents will have the same effect as if signed and executed by Defendant.

DATED this * 3 < 3

day of December

'

1997

'

BY THE COURT:
%<•

PA B. Brian
|S^
Third District Court Judgs^-
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Third District Court
£ M
By.
Deputy Clerk, Summit County

MARY ANN HANSEN (5200)
Attorney for Plaintiff
854 NORTH 910 EAST
P.O. BOX 1994
OREM, UTAH 84059
Telephone: (801) 226-0300
Facsimile: (801) 764-0300

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STEVE SCOTT,
JUDGMENT AND ORDER VESTING
TITLE OF REAL PROPERTY IN
PLAINTIFF

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

LINDA MAJORS,
Defendant.

:

Civil No. 950600019CN

:

Judge

Plaintiffs Motion for Order Vesting Title of Real Property in Plaintiff came before this
<:

Court for hearing on Wednesday, February 18, 1998. Plaintiff was represented by Mary ^

pu.+ wo/s repressed

U\ town&cl O.

Ann Hansen. Defendant was not present norwciccho represented by counsol. Based
upon Plaintiffs Motion for Order Vesting Title of Real Property in Plaintiff, the Plaintiffs
supporting memoranda, the Affidavits of Steve Scott and Mary Ann Hansen, Memorandum
of Costs and Disbursements, and Affidavit of Attorney's Fees, the pleadings on file with the
Court, oral arguments of counsel, and for good cause appearing thereon;

80&ZZ?hS? — 1

0520

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

Pursuant to Rule 70 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the court hereby

vests title to Plaintiff, Steve Scott, of real property located in Summit County, State of Utah
and more particularly described as follows:
Unit 407, Carriage House Condominiums, a Utah Condominium
Project, together with an undivided 2/325ths ownership interest
in and to the common areas and facilities of the project as the
same are identified and established in the record of survey map
recorded August 10, 1988 as Entry No. 295097 and the
condominium declarations recorded August 10, 1988 as Entry No.
295098 in Book 489 at Page 15 of the official records in the office
of the Summit County Recorder.
("The Property").
2.

That any right, title or interest of the Defendant in the Property is

hereby extinguished.
•3r——That HIaintitt isawailled a Judy mm u foi auuiimy'b fe^s in Um duiumrtnf PrrThrM?.iiii I T •!_, n^ll-tis (Tl, in -t nn|P> >
•4

That Plaintiff is awaraea a juagment tor costs in the amount dTffao

fchinrlrpri Fnnrtonn Hollaro ((D21-l.00)r*
5.

The Summit County Court Clerk currently has in their possession funds

in the amount of $1,936.76. The Court Clerk is hereby ordered to disburse said funds in
the following manner:
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a.

Pay 1997 Summit County real property taxes on the Property,

Serial Number CHC-407, in the amount of in the amount Six Hundred Fifty Three Dollars
and Ninety Six Cents ($653.96).
p-tffJ

Jb

Pay Plaintiff J jUoinoy, Mdiy Ann I lonscn, Twelve I luntired

•fifty Tour Dullm a ($ 1,254.00) foi atlui l ley's feus di id custs.
c.

Pay Defendant Twenty Eight Dollars and Eighty Cents ($28.80) a.

which is the balance held by the Court Clerk.
DATED this

/ f T day of February, 1998.
BY THE COURT:

William B. Bohling
Third District Court Judge!

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I c U ^
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Judgment and Order Vesting Title of Real Property in Plaintiff, postage prepaid, this (o
day of February, 1998.
Linda Majors
P.O. Box 1418
Twin Peaks, CA 92391
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MARY ANN HANSEN (5200)
Attorney for Plaintiff
854 NORTH 910 EAST
P.O. BOX 1994
OREM, UTAH 84059
Telephone: (801) 226-0300
Facsimile: (801) 764-0300
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STEVE SCOTT,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

0£t>£R.
ATTORNEY'S FEES JUDGMENT

:
:

LINDA MAJORS,
Defendant.

:

Civil No. 950600019CN

:

Judge

Plaintiffs Motion for Order Vesting Title of Real Property in Plaintiff came before this
Court for hearing on Wednesday, February 18, 1998. Also, Plaintiffs Petition to Nullify
Defendant's Lien, Civil No. 980600027 came before this Court at the same time. Plaintiff
was represented by Mary Ann Hansen. Defendant was represented by Dana Facemyer
who made a limited appearance. The Court entered a Judgment and Order Vesting Title
of Real Property in Plaintiff in this matter and entered an Order Nullifying Lien in Civil No.
980600027.
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The Court requested that Plaintiffs counsel prepare a supplemental order within ten
days as to attorney fees. Therefore, based upon Plaintiffs Affidavit as to Attorney's Fees,
and the pleadings on file with the Court, and for good cause appearing thereon;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

That Plaintiff is awarded a judgment for attorney's fees and costs in

the amount of One Thousand Two Hundred and Fifty Four Dollars ($1,254.00).
2.

That the Summit County Court Clerk is ordered to disburse funds

esaowed in this matter to Plaintiffs attorney, Mary Ann Hansen, in the amount of Twelve
Hundred Fifty Four dollars ($1,254.00).
DATED this lb

day of "I^OMAK-.
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1998.

ADDENDUM B
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

11 USC §553. Setoff
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section and in sections 362 and 363 of this title, this
title does not affect any right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt owing by such creditor to the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against a claim of such
creditor against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case, except to the
extent that(1) the claim of such creditor against the debtor is disallowed other than under section
502(b)(3) of this title;
(2) such claim was transferred, by and entity other than the debtor, to such cr editor ~
(A) after the commencement of the case; or
(B)(i) after 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; and
(ii) white the debtor was insolvent; or
(3) the debt owed to the debtor by such creditor was incurred by such creditor(A) after 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition;
(B) while the debtor was insolvent; and
(C) for the purpose of obtaining a right of setoff against the debtor.
(b)(1) Except with respect to a setoff of a kind described in section 362 (b)(6), 362(b)(B7)„
365(h)(2), or 365(i)(2) of this title, if a creditor offsets a mutual debt owing to the debtor
against a claim against the debtor on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the
petition, then the trustee may recover from such creditor the amount so offset to the extent that
any insufficiency on the date of such setoff is less than the insufficiency on the latter of—
(A) 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; and
(B) the first date during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the filing
of the petition on which there is an insufficiency.
(2) In this subsection, "insufficiency" means amount, if any, by which a claim against the
debtor exceeds a mutual debt owing to the debtor by the holder of such claim.
(c) For the purposes of this section, the debtor is presumed to have been insolvent on and
during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition.

AIJEUth 824.
Liquor license as subject to execution or attachment, 40 A.L.R.4th 927.
Lien of judgment on excess value of homestead, 41 A.L.R4th 292.
Constitutionality, construction, and application of statute as to effect of taking appeal, or
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Rule 70. Judgment for specific acts; vesting title.
If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or to deliver
deeds or other documents or to perform any other specific act and^the party
fails to comply within the time specified, the court may direct the act to be
done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person appointed by
the court and the act when so done has like effect as if done by the party. On
application of the party entitled to performance and upon order of the court,
the clerk shall issue a writ of attachment or sequestration against the property of the disobedient party to compel obedience to the judgment. The court
may also in proper cases adjudge the party in contempt. If real or personal
property is within the state, the court in lieu of directing a conveyance thereof
may enter a judgment divesting the title of any party and vesting it in others
and such judgment has the effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law.
When any order or judgment is for the delivery of possession, the party in
whose favor it is entered is entitled to a writ of execution or assistance upon
application to the clerk.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 70,J&\R.CJ\
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